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This Note examines the history of employment-based health insurance and the in-
herent historical limitations that have led to an erosion of health insurance
coverage. Based on a review of several studies, this Note argues that the number of
uninsured Americans has reached crisis proportions. State reform efforts, legisla-
tive proposals, and other proposed solutions have failed to repair the system.
Nonetheless, this Note argues that employment-based health care is integral to the
structure of national health care. Furthermore, health insurance coverage can be
increased by combining employment-based health care with three reforms: large-
employer mandates, refundable tax credits, and purchasing pools. This Note con-
cludes that, despite its flaws, the employment-based health care system can serve as
a foundation on which to make effective changes and increase levels of health in-
surance coverage.
"Every day, we worry ... [f]or now, I live with a knot in my
stomach each day[.]"'
"When I was uninsured, my wife and I had to weigh our
health decisions, questioning whether our child was sick
enough to justify a visit to the doctor[.], 2
"[W]e are playing Russian roulette with our own health
care.
In their own words, uninsured Americans tell a heartbreaking
story of worry, guilt, and, above all, awareness of what a risky
proposition it is to be uninsured in the United States.
* B.S. 2000, University of Colorado; J.D. candidate University of Michigan Law
School. The author would like to thank her family and friends, especially her husband Alex,
for their encouragement and support. She would also like to extend her appreciation to
Professor Melissa Hart of The University of Colorado School of Law for her invaluable sug-
gestions and comments.
1. COVERTHEUNINSUREOWEEK.ORG, PERSONAL STORIES: MELISSA ADAMS (2004),
available at http://covertheuninsuredweek.org/stories/index.php?StorylD=33 (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
2. COVERTHEUNINSUREDWEEK.ORG, PERSONAL STORIES: JOSEPH CABRERA (2004),
available at http://covertheuninsuredweek.org/stories/index.php?StorylD=13 (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
3. COVERTHEUNINSUREDWEEK.ORG, PERSONAL STORIES: DEB PETrID (2004), available
at http://covertheuninsuredweek.org/stories/index.php?StorylD=6 (on file with the Uni-
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Although the United States spends an estimated $1.4 trillion on
health care and is projected to spend as much as $1.8 trillion in
2005, which is twice as much per person than any other industrial-
ized country, the number of uninsured Americans has increased
for the second consecutive year.4 The most recent annual report
released by the U.S. Census Bureau in its Current Population Sur-
vey shows that in 2002, about 15.2% of Americans, or 43.6 million
people, did not have health care coverage for the year, a 2.4 mil-
lion increase from the previous year.5 The uninsured are not
clustered geographically; the states with the largest number of un-
insured people range across the country and include California,
Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois. Contrary to popular percep-
tion, the uninsured are working. Of the people who were
uninsured during 2001-2002, 70.7% were employed and 7.2%
were actively looking for employment.7 Lack of health care cover-
age cuts across income levels: although more than half of
individuals in families with incomes at or below the federal poverty
level were uninsured, 16.5% of people with incomes four-or more
times the poverty level were also uninsured.8
These statistics have real, life-and-death effects. The uninsured
often forego preventive care, such as routine checkups and cancer
screening, and delay or forego needed medical care for chronic
conditions or recommended treatments. 9 As a result, the unin-
sured have a fifteen to eighteen percent mortality rate increase
compared to those who are insured, and as many as 18,000 unin-
4. OFFICE OF DISABILITY, AGING AND LONG-TERM CARE POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADDRESSING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: REFORMING
THE MEDICAL LITIGATION SYSTEM TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 11 (March 3,
2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/medliab.htm (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). See also Robert F. Rich, Health Policy, Health
Insurance and the Social Contract, 21 CoMp. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 397, 414 (2000) ("The paradox
of the U.S. health care system is that we spend more on health care than any other country
in the world, but we do not observe a similar increase in the quality of care that is being
provided."); Gina Keating, Strike Shows Health Care Boots Pay as No. 1 Issue, REUTERS NEWS
SERV., Oct. 13, 2003, at http://www.insurance-portal.com/101503.htm#3 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("In 2000, the United States spent $1.3 tril-
lion on health care, more than any other developed nation and more than it spent on
national defense[.]").
5. Lisa Richwine, Those Without Health Insurance Increasing, REUTERS NEWS SERV., Sept.
30, 2003, at http://ists.insurance-letter.com/archives/insurance-letter/200310/msgO000.
html#2 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
6. FAMILIES USA, GOING WITHOUT HEATH INSURANCE: NEARLY ONE IN THREE NON-
ELDERLY AMERICANS 3 (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/
Going-withoutreport.pdfdocD=273 (on file with the. University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 6.
9. Id. at 14-15.
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sured people die each year because of a lack of health insurance.0
The uninsured also affect emergency care for all patients. Cur-
rently, many uninsured people forego traditional doctor's office
visits; uninsured adults are four. times more likely, and uninsured
children are five times more likely, to visit emergency rooms as a
regular place of care.'
Any hospital that receives Medicare funds-virtually all any hos-
pitals in the United States-is required "to provide treatment to all
patients seeking care for emergency medical conditions regardless
of the ability to pay and regardless of their eligibility for Medi-
care."12 As a result, emergency rooms are crowded with people who
have non-emergency illnesses, such as diabetes, heart disease, and
flu. When emergency rooms are crowded with those who a primary
care physician could treat, there are longer waits for true emer-
gencies. In addition, society subsidizes these visits. When the
uninsured go to private hospitals, the cost of care is added to the
bills of insured patients, ultimately passing through the system to
insured patients and their employers in the form of higher premi-
ums and deductibles. When the hospital is public, the costs are
borne by taxpayers through state and county spending on indigent
health care services.
4
Many commentators and politicians describe these alarming ef-
fects as a genuine health care crisis. They attribute the number of
uninsured to decreased, employment-based coverage resulting
from lostjobs as the economy struggles through a recession, as well
as to sharply rising health care costs. 5 Many employers-mainly
small employers, low-wage employers, and employers with older
workers-do not offer health insurance because the cost of provid-
ing health insurance to their employees is simply unaffordable.1
6
10. Critical Condition: Peter Jennings Interviews ABC NEWS' Medical Editor on the Health-
Care Crisis, ABCNEws.CoM, Oct. 21, 2003, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/WNT/
DrJohnson/healthcare03102l.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
11. FAMILIES USA, supra note 6 at 14. In Denver, "[t]he crush of nonpaying patients
has forced both of Denver's public hospitals to post nurses at the door to screen out people
who don't have a life-or-death problem." Allison Sherry & Marsha Austin, The Uninsured: Less
Money for System, Fewer Options for Patients, DENVER POST, Mar. 9, 2003, at 2.
12. Rich, supra note 4, at 406 (describing the Emergency Medical Treatment and Ac-
tive Labor Act of 1986).
13. James B. Roche, Health Care in America: Why We Need Universal Health Care and Why
We Need It Now, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1013, 1023 (2001).
14. Id.
15. FAMILIES USA, supra note 6, at 11.
16. Id.
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Even where employers do offer health insurance coverage, some
employees cannot afford to pay their share of the premium cost.1
7
Predictably, there is sharp division among lawmakers, insurance
companies, and employers over the proposed solutions to this cri-
sis. Proposals include transitioning from the United States'
traditionally employment-based system to a single-payor system run
by the federal government; mandating employment-based cover-
age; structuring small- and medium-sized insurance purchasing
pools; and providing voucher-like tax credits to the uninsured.
Because a problem of this magnitude did not pop up overnight,
Part I of this paper will present a brief history of employment-
based health care and failed legislative attempts to repair the sys-
tem, and will summarize some of the more innovative state
solutions to the problem. Next, Part II will use California's Measure
SB2, requiring businesses to offer health care coverage, to provide
context for a more detailed examination of the strengths and
weaknesses of the employer-based system and employer-mandated
coverage. Finally, Part III will survey the battleground over who
should pay for health care coverage, and will advocate reform that
blends employer mandates, tax credits, and purchasing pools.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE HEALTH-CARE DEBATE
The current American health care system is largely employment-
based. While there are government programs that cover the poor
and elderly, such as Medicaid and Medicare, employment-based
health insurance covers 61.3% of the population. 8 Employment-
based health benefits have become such a hot-button issue in labor
negotiations that in 2003, more than 80,000 supermarket workers
in California and four other states went on strike and transit work-
ers in Los Angeles and garbage workers in Chicago walked off the
job, all disputing proposed changes in their health benefits.' 9 Some
employees are even agreeing to accept smaller pay raises in ex-
change for retention of health plans that require them to pay little
or nothing for comprehensive health insurance.0
17. Id.
18. The percent of the population covered by employment-based health insurance ac-
tually decreased 1.3% from 2001. See Richwine, supra note 5.
19. David E. Rosenbaum, Co-Paying the Piper: Do Some Pay Too Little for Health Care?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, at 1.
20. Workers at Verizon and the Big Three automakers have agreed to these conces-
sions. Id.
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Employment-based health care was not always the norm. In fact,
it is a relatively new innovation that has gradually gained ground
over the past few decades, assisted in part by legislation and the
rise of the managed care system. Part I addresses the historical cir-
cumstances contributing to the current popularity of employment-
based health care, and examines the failure of national legislation
to address many of the problems with the system. Finally, Part I
ends with a discussion of the various ways that states have at-
tempted, with mixed success, to close the gaps created by
piecemeal regulation of employment-based health care.
A. How Did We Get Here? The History of
Employment-Based Health Insurance
Before World War II, employers provided few Americans with
health insurance: one estimate suggests that only four million
Americans, or approximately 3% of the population, had employ-
ment-based coverage in 1930.1 However, during World War II the
Office of Price Administration implemented wage and price con-
trols over employee wages in an attempt to stem inflation. Many
benefits, such as employer-provided insurance and pensions, were
not included in wage calculations and, therefore, were excluded
from the controls.2 Freezing wages combated inflation, but, as a
secondary effect, forced employers to compete in the labor market
by enhancing fringe benefits such as health insurance.24 Labor un-
ions promoted the provision of such benefits and, during the late
1940s and 1950s, insisted on increasingly richer benefit packages as
25
compensation.
In addition to providing a means by which employers could
compete for labor, there were, and still are, tax incentives that en-
courage employers to contribute to health insurance and
employees to seek employer-based plans. The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) and Congress, in turn, expressly allowed employers
to deduct insurance payments as ordinary and necessary business
21. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 23, 25 (2001). Some employers were an exception and
offered forms of managed care to workers and their families, but the medical profession
"vehemently opposed such 'contract' or 'corporate' practice, and sought to limit the spread




25. Id. at 26.
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expenses without requiring them to include the amounts as in-
come paid to employees. 26 The tax treatment effectively provides a
subsidy for employment-based health care (currently worth a total
of more than $100 billion in foregone tax revenue per year), allow-
ing employers to purchase health insurance by using employees'
before-tax income instead of forcing employees to purchase it with
27
after-tax income. The subsidy created a significant incentive for
employees to continue receiving health insurance through their
employers, and provided a means for employers to avoid the full
impact of tax rates that, during World War II, were as high as
85%. s Currently, this subsidy creates a major barrier to reworking
the employment-based health care system: the government is effec-
tively paying half of each employee's premium, which encourages
employees to prefer employer-provided health insurance to taxable
income. 9
By 1954, because of the wage controls, union endorsement of
employer-provided benefits, and the federal tax structure, em-
ployment-based health insurance covered 70% of all workers.30
Commentators have noted that the popularity of such plans has led
to a uniquely American view of health care as a privilege, expressed
as a benefit of employment."' However, this view is changing as the
percentage of the population covered under employment-based
plans has steadily decreased and more Americans join the ranks of
the uninsured.
32
26. Id. at 25. The IRS issued a ruling to this effect in 1943, and withdrew it ten years
later. Id. In 1954, Congress effectively resurrected the ruling by amending the Internal
Revenue Code to "expressly exclude employment-based coverage from taxable income." Id.
27. Id. As Hyman and Hall explain it, the subsidy "is a function of the marginal tax rate
for any given taxpayer, but its size is larger for higher-income taxpayers because of the pro-
gressivity of federal taxation." Id.
28. Dayna Bowen Matthew, Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health
Insurance: Of Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1042
(1996). The tax structure allowed employers to spend fifteen cents on each after-tax dollar
to offer health benefits and permitted the employer to deduct the payments as a business
expense and exclude the benefit from employees' taxable income. Id.
29. NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, CONSENSUS ON HEALTH REFORM BRIEF ANALYSIS
No. 199 (1996), available at http://www.ncpa.org/ba/ba199.html (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter CONSENSUS ON. HEALTH REFORM].
Every dollar of health insurance premiums paid by employers escapes an income tax, "a 15.3
percent Social Security (FICA) tax, and a 4, 5, or 6 percent state and local income tax, de-
pending on where the employee lives.... For an employee in the 50 percent tax bracket, for
example, $2 of nontaxed health insurance need be worth only slightly more than $1 to be
preferable to $2 of taxable wages." Id. This subsidy costs the federal government about $84
billion a year in tax subsidies for employer-provided health. insurance, and state and local
governments pay another $10 billion. Id.
30. Id.
31. Rich, supra note 4, at 399.
32. Matthew, supra note 28.
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Recent polls show that a majority of Americans are concerned
about the future of the health insurance system.33 Mobilization ef-
forts such as Cover the Uninsured Week, supported by former
Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, have attempted to focus
the nation's attention on the plight of the uninsured. Such efforts
have renewed the debate over solutions to the employment-based
system-a system that, though historically entrenched, is increas-
ingly seen as 'flawed.
B. Federal Failures: Regulatory Gaps and Failed
Attempts to Expand Coverage
Federal legislation is one of the most frequently advocated
methods of expanding the scope of health-care coverage to include
those outside the employment system. The checkerboard of regu-
lations, including Medicare and Medicaid, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), the State Children's
Health Insurance Program ("SCHIP"), and the Consolidated Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA"), have helped cover
people left out by the now-traditional employment-based system;
however, haphazard coverage and preemption of traditional forms
of regulation actually worsen the problem by leaving employment-
based health insurance effectively unregulated 5 Compounding
the problem, more far-reaching legislative efforts such as the Clin-
ton-sponsored Health Security Act of 1993 have failed to
substantially reform the health care system.
Medicare3 6 and Medicaid 7 provide an entitlement to health in-
surance coverage for the elderly and for low-income people who
meet eligibility standards and work to cushion the effects of the
decrease in employment-based health care coverage. Medicare
covers nearly all of the elderly,d' while Medicaid covered about
33. An ABC News poll shows that, although 64% of people with health insurance are
satisfied with their health care, 59% are worried about being able to afford it in the future.
See Critical Condition, supra note 10.
34. Press Release, CoverTheUninsuredWeek.org, Former Presidents, Surgeons Gen-
eral and Health Secretaries Head Effort on Uninsured (Sept. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.covertheuninsuredweek.org/media/docs/release093003.php3 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
35. Hyman & Hall, supra note 21, at 29.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1370 (2000).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2001).
38. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, KEY FACTS: THE UNINSURED
AND THEIR ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 1 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.publiceducation.
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25.7% of the population in 2002, up from 25.3% in 2001.39 How-
ever, Medicaid coverage for adults is limited by stringent income
eligibility standards0 and, faced with budget deficits and rising
Medicaid enrollment, many states are looking toward cutting
Medicaid benefits to low-income people to help balance state
budgets."
SCHIP 42 has reduced the number of uninsured poor and near-
poor children and "represents the greatest investment the United
States has made in children since the enactment of Medicaid."0
3
SCHIP was enacted in 1997 and provided $48 billion over ten years
to states, which were required to choose between expanding Medi-
caid to cover more children or creating new programs to cover
children under the age of 19 whose families are ineligible for
Medicaid and meet specified income guidelines. Despite the lim-
ited success of SCHIP, 9.2 million children remain uninsured.4'
Although ERISA's stated purpose is to protect employees par-
ticipating in employee benefit plans,0 the statute is limited to
"welfare benefit plans," also known as employment-based health
insurance plans.47 ERISA creates a large loophole in the regulatory
scheme: insured plans are subject to state regulation, while self-
insured plans are only subject to ERISA's "relatively lax regulatory
scheme." 48 As a result, employment-based health insurance is effec-
tively unregulated, since ERISA fails to seal the gaps in regulatory
oversight.
COBRA 9 was heralded as a program in which the federal gov-
ernment had finally acted to stem the growing tide of uninsured
org/pdf/CHIP/Uninsured andTheirAccess.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
39. Richwine, supra note 5.
40. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 38, at 2 ("[E]ven
the poorest are generally ineligible if they do not have children.").
41. Charles Ornstein & Sue Fox, The State; Blazing a Trail for Health Care, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2003, at Al.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ii (2001).
43. Rich, supra note 4, at 411.
44. Id.
45. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 38, at 1.
46. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (1994). See also Matthew, supra note 28, at n. 165.
47. Matthew, supra note 28, at 1065, 1067 ("Health insurance provided by employers
through commercial insurance companies is a welfare benefit plan.").
48. Id. at 1065.
49. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1994). COBRA is a part of ERISA and "provides that health plans must
allow a qualified employee to continue coverage for a minimum of 18 months and imposes a
duty on the plan administrator to notify participants or their beneficiaries of such a right."
Matthew, supra note 28, at n. 166 (citations omitted).
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and provide an answer to what is described as 'job-lock." 'Job-lock"
is the predicament that results from the linkage of employment
and health coverage: many health insurance policies include wait-
ing periods or exclusions for pre-existing conditions, or the worker
may particularly value the terms of her current coverage, which
can chill job mobility." Congress also saw COBRA as a solution to a
related problem: when workers lose their job, they also lose their
health care coverage. Congress designed COBRA to enhance con-
tinuity and portability of health care coverage,5' but its effects have
been limited. While it does allow employees to continue the cover-
age received under the employment-based system, it requires
employees to pay a 2% fee in addition to paying the full cost of
their premiums.52 As a result, the costs of such coverage are often
prohibitive: an estimated four out of five unemployed workers who
were eligible for COBRA coverage declined to purchase it.
53
Although more comprehensive federal legislation is needed to
close the regulatory gaps, when legislators have proposed such re-
forms, critics have vociferously opposed them. Perhaps the most
notorious example of the failure of national legislation is the
Health Security Act of 1993 ("HSA"). 4 The premise of the pro-
posed legislation was a re-envisioning of health care as a legal right
for all citizens, not a privilege conferred by employment.55 The Act
proposed universal access to health care by "providing incentives to
private insurance companies, enabling the formation of small
groups and 'purchasing cooperatives,' and by increasing the role
of government in providing access and services, as required."5 6
Large insurance companies, businesses and provider groups
waged a public relations and lobbying war to convince Americans
that the Clinton proposals would increase the cost of health care,
extend the scope of government regulation over individual choice
to an unacceptable level, and decrease the quality of health care
50. Hyman & Hall, supra note 21, at 28.
51. Id. at 29.
52. FAMILIESUSA, supra note 6, at 11 ("[A]n unemployed worker must usually pay the
employer's full costs... plus a 2% administrative fee. The national average cost of employer-
provided family coverage plus a 2% fee is $8,113 a year.").
53. Id.
54. The HSA was, by no means, the only proposal introduced. In the same period, at
least ten alternative proposals for health care reform were introduced, all of which were
defeated in Congress. Rich, supra note 4, at 408. See also Theda Skocpol, The Rise and Re-
soundingDemise of the Clinton Plan, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Spring 1995, at 66.
55. Rich, supra note 4, at 408. The Supreme Court has held that there is no fundamen-
tal right to health care nor is the United States obligated to provide health care to its
citizens. Scott D. Litman, Note, Health Care Reform for the Twenty-First Century: The Need for a
Federal and State Partnership, 7 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 871, 877 (1998).
56. Id.
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that citizens receive.57 Americans and other established participants
in the health care system, accustomed to the workings of the em-
ployer-based system, became worried that the Clinton plan would
drastically change or restructure the way the system had operated:
The critiques from employers and the health care industry, as well
as the partisan attacks, focused these worries and ultimately per-
suaded Americans to reject the plan.
C. State Efforts
Due to the failure of federal legislation to satisfactorily regulate
employment-based health insurance, and to the collapse of pro-
posed legislation that would dramatically expand coverage by
reforming the employment-based system, there is increasing sen-
timent that states should step up to the regulatory plate.0
State and local governments are getting increasingly creative in
their search for solutions to the health-care crisis. Approaches in-
clude creating purchasing pools to make health insurance more
affordable for small businesses (California and New York City), im-
plementing programs that subsidize the employee share of health
insurance premiums for low-wage workers (Massachusetts, San
Diego, Oregon, and Rhode Island), 6' and enacting mandates re-
62quiring businesses to provide health insurance (Hawaii). Despite
the variety of approaches, state and local governments have failed
to make significant inroads on the crisis.
The biggest problem with the most obvious solution, subsidies
for employees, is money. With the current state of the economy,
many state and local governments are struggling to fund even basic
services, let alone provide subsidies for health care. As a result,
states have managed to scrounge money from less traditional
places: at various times, Massachusetts' Insurance Partnership pro-
gram has funded the program from federal matching Medicaid
57. Id.
58. Skocpol, supra note 54, at 78.
59. Id.
60. According to E. Richard Brown, director of the UCLA Center for -Health Policy
Research, "[w]e see little evidence from Washington that the current administration and the
current Congress are going- to do anything about the huge number of uninsured people in
the country ... I think there's growing sentiment that states need to do something." Orn-
stein & Fox, supra note 41.
61. Kimberly Weisul, Throwing a Line to Uninsured Workers, Bus. WK., Oct. 13, 2003, at 1.
62. Ornstein & Fox, supra note 41.
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funds, the state budget, and tobacco settlement money." There are
also strict guidelines on who can benefit from the program: to
qualify, small companies must pay at least half their workers' pre-
miums and individual employees must make less than twice the
federal poverty guidelines.64
Some programs, such as New York City's HealthPass program
and Michigan's Muskegon County Community Health Project, are
even more innovative. The HealthPass program does not offer sub-
sidies, but eases administrative burdens on small companies by
offering the employers a choice of 26 plans although the employer
only writes one check.65 HealthPass covers 80% of its costs through
fees and is expected to break even by the end of 2004.66 Muskegon
County subsidizes health-care costs through a combination of
Medicaid money and direct contracts with doctors, through which
67the organization has convinced many doctors to lower their rates.
Hawaii is the only state that has enacted and implemented em-
ployer-mandated health care insurance. Hawaii's Prepaid Health
Care Act 9 requires most businesses to provide health insurance to
employees who work at least 20 hours per week for four consecu-
tive week . Employers may cover the full cost of coverage or may
choose to share the costs with their employees based on a fixed
formula that requires the employer to contribute 50% of the cost
and limits the employee's share to 1.5% of wages.7' The mandate
had dramatic effects at first, reducing Hawaii's uninsured popula-
tion from 30% in the early 1970s to as low as 5% in the 1980s.n
However, the percentage of uninsured has recently increased to
10% of Hawaii's population, and it is estimated that 58% of the
uninsured are employed . The increase is often attributed to a
combination of several factors: sharply rising insurance rates, a
63. 'Weisul, supra note 61.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2.
67. Id.
68. Ornstein & Fox, supra note 41. Massachusetts and Oregon passed similar man-
dates, but, in the face of strong business opposition, repealed them before they took effect.
Id.
69. HAw. REV. STAT. § 393 (1974).
70. THE HAWAI'I UNINSURED PROJECT, HAWAII'S PREPAID HEALTH CARE ACT ENSURES
HEALTH COVERAGE FOR SOME WORKERS 1, at http://www.healthcoveragehawaii.org/pdf/
PrepaidHealthCareAct.pdf (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
71. THE. HAWAI'I UNINSURED PROJECT, PREPAID HEALTH CARE ACT 1, at http://
www.healthcoveragehawaii.org/target/prepaid.html (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
72. THE HAWAI'I UNINSURED PROJECT, supra note 70.
73. Id.
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number of blows to Hawaii's tourism-based economy that caused
many employers to cut costs by hiring part-time workers, and an
increase in the number of self-employed workers.4
Hawaii's program had a drastic effect on employment patterns
and practices in the state. The employer mandate caused about
55% of Hawaii's employers to restrict wage increases and caused
about 33% to reduce other employee benefits.75 Employment statis-
tics worsened as a result of the mandate: about 40% of employers
reduced the number of employees and 10% hired part-time in-
stead of full-time workers.76 The mandate also affected the
economy: 60% of the employers raised prices to offset the burden
created by employer mandates.7
Hawai'i's predicament demonstrates that, although employer
mandates can be successful when regulating larger businesses, em-
ployees of small- to medium-size companies and self-employed
workers still slip through the cracks. Employer mandates are only
part of an effective reform.
II. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY:
EMPLOYER MANDATES AND CALIFORNIA'S
LANDMARK LEGISLATION
Although the effectiveness of employer-mandated coverage is in
dispute, as seen in Hawaii's struggle with such mandates, California
recently enacted a proposal to require that many California em-
ployers offer health insurance to their employees. To provide some
context for examining the overall structure of employer mandates,
Part II of this paper first examines California's legislation. The next
section of Part II identifies the benefits and beneficiaries of em-
ployer-mandated coverage, and then suggests a better, more
workable solution.
74. Matt Sedensky, Hawaii's Uninsured Population Grows, Assoc. PRESS, Oct. 21, 2003, at
http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/living/health/7065117.htm (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
75. NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, Is HAWAII A MODEL FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM?
BRIEF ANALYSIS No. 126 (Aug. 19, 1994), available at http://www.ncpa.org/ba/ba126.html
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A. California's Plan: Hanging Hopes on SB2
The recently passed California measure, SB2,7 is a ray of hope
for many: it finally addresses the growing number of uninsured in
California, and experts hope the bill will jump-start sputtering ef-
forts in other states. According to legislative findings, the bill will
help provide coverage to the more than 80% of California's work-
ing uninsured and their families.79
In short, the bill establishes the State Health Purchasing Pro-
gram, and provides health care to employees that work at least one
hundred hours per month and have worked for the same employer
for three months."" It begins regulating large employers first, then
moves down the ladder to smaller employers: employers with more
than two hundred employees must begin offering benefits byJanu-
ary 2006, but the legislation gives employers with between twenty
and two hundred employees until 2007 to offer coverage.8 1 Em-
ployers may choose between providing health coverage and paying
a fee to the state, which would be used to pay for coverage. If the
employer chooses to provide health coverage, it will be required to
pay at least 80% of the cost of the policy, with the remaining cost
paid by the employee. The legislature attempted to mitigate the
effects on medium-size businesses by providing that employers with
at least twenty workers, but fewer than fifty, are only required to
provide health insurance if the California legislature also passed a
businesses. 3 The legislature did not forget20% tax credit for those iess s iltr dntfre
family members: businesses with at least two hundred employees
must also cover their employees' dependants.84
California's bill should decrease the number of uninsured pa-
tients in emergency rooms, saving millions in charity costs, as well
as other added costs that emergency room backlogs add to the
economy.5 When California reaches its 2006 and 2007 deadlines,
78. Health Insurance Act of 2003, CAL. LABOR CODE § 2120 (West 2003).
79. Id. § I (d).
80. CAL. LABOR CODE § 2122.2 (West 2003).
81. Health Insurance Legislation At-A-Glance, Assoc. PREss, Sept. 13, 2003, 1, at http://
www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2003/09/13/state0640EDT0042.TL&




85. All Things Considered Profile: California Bill that Would Require Businesses to Provide
Health Insurance for Employees and their Dependents (National Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 22,
2003). To illustrate the magnitude of the problem, in 2002, more than 40% of the billed
medical service charges at Denver Health Medical Center were not paid. Sherry & Austin,
supra note 11, at 3.
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only those employees who meet the minimum time and duration
requirements and work for businesses with at least fifty employees
will benefit from the legislation. However, the mandate still fails to
cover many Californians; in particular, those employees who work
part-time, have recently changed jobs, work for small businesses, or
are unemployed.
B. A Crash Course in Employer-Mandated Coverage
Ironically, while California's efforts and employer-mandated
health care in general do provide benefits to the some uninsured
people, the scheme may harm the very people legislatures aim to
protect and may ultimately generate a detrimental ripple effect in
the business economy.
1. The Right Stuff: The Benefits of Employer-Based Coverage-When
employers offer health insurance to employees, they satisfy the
needs of workers, increase the quality of care and reinforce Ameri-
cans' views on government involvement. In addition, employment-
based health insurance improves market conditions by solving
market imperfections, and, generally, helps maintain a functioning
market for insurance.
Surveys show that employees are generally satisfied with. their
employment-based coverage. 6 The pervasiveness of employment-
based health insurance allows employers use their market power to
pressure providers to improve the quality of care. Groups of em-
ployers have successfully initiated economic incentives to improve
the quality of care provided; instead of paying providers based on
service targets (e.g., the number of patients treated and the
amount of time spent with a patient), employers have tied com-
pensation to performance." Some employers have also decided to
purchase health care services only from providers who have made
specified investments in error reduction safeguards.8
Employment-based coverage also agrees with traditional Ameri-
can attitudes regarding government involvement in personal
information. When employers handle coverage, "the government's
86. Hyman & Hall, supra note 21, at 30.
87. Id. at 35.
88. Id. One employer group estimates that investments including computerized sys-
tems for prescribing medicines, twenty-four hour staffing of intensive care units by critical
care physicians, and referral of complex procedures to hospitals with the highest survival
rates, if implemented by all non-rural hospitals, could save up to 58,300 lives per year and
prevent 522,000 medication errors. Id.
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access to sensitive information on its citizens is sharply con-
strained." 9 Although employees are still wary of employers
possessing this information, they are far less concerned than they
would be if the government had access. Administration costs of
employment-based coverage are relatively lean compared to the
massive bureaucracy that would likely arise if coverage were han-
dled by the government, gratifying Americans who doubt the
competence and compassion of government bureaucracy.
90
Low administrative and marketing costs mean that employers
improve market conditions and create efficiencies of scale, increas-
ing the portion of the insurance premium that goes to pay medical
costs rather than to administrative overhead.91 Employment-based
insurance also mitigates the market effects of "adverse selection,"
which occurs when potential insureds know more about their par-
ticular risks than the insurer knows. When an insurer prices its
product, it calculates the risk for the market segment it is evaluat-
ing. However, within market segments, people are not
homogenous-they have different risks of illness. If only some
people purchase insurance and if the insurer does not learn this
information, disproportionate numbers of sicker people will sub-
scribe "because those with greater than average risk will find the
average price more attractive than those of lesser risk."9 Ferreting
out risk information can be costly and often prices higher-risk
people out of the market.94 Employment-based risk pools reduce
the market cost of insurance by alleviating cost increases associated
with adverse risk selection and risk rating. The pools exist for rea-
sons independent of the demand for coverage, so insurers can
"safely assume that the group's future medical expenses will ap-
proximate the group's recent experience, [allowing] the insurer to
assess the overall group's average risk simply by observing its claims
experience ... rather than assessing each individual member's
risk. 99 This disconnect between the group and the demand for
coverage means thatgroup members will not select in or select out
just because of risk or cost; the group's risk remains stable, so in-
surance coverage can be written at lower cost than individual
89. Id. at 33.
90. Id.
91. The largest employer groups incur overhead costs of less than 5%, compared to
20% for smaller groups and more than 30% for individual purchasers. Id. at 31.
92. Id. Adverse selection exists to some degree in all insurance markets and, at an ex-
treme, may destroy the market. Id. at 32.
93. Id. at 31.
94. Id. at 32.
95. Id.
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plans.9 6 Finally, workers are, on average, healthier than non-
workers,97 lowering the cost of coverage even further.
2. Here's the Catch: Downsides to Employer-Based Coverage and Gov-
ernment Mandates-While there are a great many positive aspects of
employer-based health care coverage, there are a number of iden-
tified drawbacks as well. When it comes to health care coverage,
employers and employees have conflicting interests that are not
always resolved in favor of the employee. Further, when employers
are required to pay for the majority of the premium cost, those ex-
penses are set-off by decreases in employee compensation.
Requiring employers to pay for health coverage may harm small-
and medium-size business, and limit business' ability to respond to
market changes.
Employers choose health insurance plans with an eye toward
maximizing their labor supply while incurring the lowest possible
expense. Therefore, employers generally offer the wage-benefit
package that will be optimal for the average employee. 97 Employer
information as to employee preferences for coverage and quality of
health care is imperfect,98 so an employer-selected optimal benefit
package will only satisfy the needs of a homogeneous group of
workers. However, employees are a heterogeneous group; they are
people of different genders, backgrounds, and ages, with and
without dependants, and, therefore have different incidences of
illness and medical needs." The result is a predictable disjunction
between the coverage preferences of the employee and the optimal
plan selected by the employer.'0
Employees likely will not notice the divergence until well after
employment begins. Employers list health insurance as an available
benefit to employees, butjob applicants often note the benefit as a
positive without really investigating or having the opportunity to
investigate the policy's terms.'0 1 Even if employees did investigate
and review an employer's coverage, the average worker is not likely
to be familiar enough with the terms of competing health insur-
96. Id.
97. Matthew, supra note 28, at 1056.
98. Hyman & Hall, supra note 21, at 27.
99. Matthew, supra note 28, at 1056.
100. Hyman & Hall, supra note 21, at 27.
101. Matthew, supra note 28, at 1062. Professor Matthew explains that it is almost im-
possible for employees to monitor an employer's insurance purchase ex ante: the
employment contract is usually signed well after the employer has negotiated the insurance
coverage, insurance contracts are complex and usually inaccessible for comparison until
after the employee has commenced her employment, and the market for most positions
does not permit side-by-side comparisons of similar jobs with different health care plans. Id.
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ance plans to be able to compare the employer's program with
others in the market.
1 0 2
The employment-based health care system has become so in-
grained in the collective labor psyche of Americans that many
workers fail to realize that they do actually pay for benefits in the
form of decreased compensation. Employer contributions to
health insurance plans are actually a form of compensation to the
employee, despite tax treatment to the contrary, and as coverage
costs increase, the result is lower wages for the employee.1 0 3 Most
employees believe that the employer is footing the entire bill for
employees' health care coverage, and are thus relatively indifferent
to the cost of their coverage. 104 Because of this indifference, experts
speculate that Americans over consume with respect to health care:
they see doctors more often, elect more procedures, and take more
medicine than needed simply because most of the cost is covered
by insurance. Studies show that the drastic increase in health care
spending over the past thirty years parallels the decline in the pa-
tient's share of the health care bill from 48% in 1960 to 21%
today.10 6 Many economists have concluded that Americans' over
consumption of health care will cause health care costs to spiral
out of control unless patients are required to pay more out-of-
pocket for their care. 0 7 This perpetuates the dilemma: as health
care costs rise, employees are forced to pay more of their wages to
support their coverage.
These faults in the employer-based system can slow business
growth when the government implements mandates. The major
objection that most employers make to mandated coverage is not
necessarily the increasing cost of coverage per se, but the effects
that increased costs have on business competition. Employer-
mandated coverage can slow growth as employers spend more of
their revenue on employee benefits instead of developing their
businesses. In California, many employers already view the state's
102. Id. Even when a prospective employee is able to compare the coverage, the em-
ployee is unlikely to object to the terms of the policy and is "even less likely to find
objectionable features of the policy a dispositive factor" in the choice of whether or not to
accept the position. Id. at 1063.
103. Hyman & Hall, supra note 21, at 28.
104. Id.
105. Rosenbaum, supra note 19, at 1.
106. NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 29.
107. Rosenbaum, supra note 19, at 3. But health economist Uwe Reinhardt disagrees
with the effects that requiring higher out-of-pocket payments will have on low-income work-
ers: if people pay more for health care, it results in "rationing health care according to
income. People like you and me would continue to get all we want, and those without means
would have to do without." Id.
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high tax rates as unfriendly to business.'O" New financial burdens on
employers could drive businesses away from California or slow
expansion to a halt.'19 Employers are also concerned about the
patchwork of state regulations; with such wide variations in state
regulations, it is impossible to have consistent policies when
operating across the country." Consequently, to avoid employing
people who work enough hours to qualify for employer-mandated
coverage, employers may simply hire greater numbers of
inexpensive, part-time workers.
III. EMPLOYER MANDATES + INNOVATION = A SOLUTION
TO THE HEALTH INSURANCE CRISIS
There are few simple solutions to complex problems. While em-
ployer-based health insurance may be such an entrenched system
with enough benefits and effectiveness to make it impracticable to
completely overhaul, there are still gaping coverage gaps that re-
sult in significant numbers of uninsured persons. Employer-
mandates may reduce the number of uninsured, but they have un-
acceptable effects on the labor market and small- to medium-size
businesses, and fail to cover many low-income workers and non-
workers. Existing legislation fails to fill coverage gaps or mitigate
effects on small- and mid-sized businesses; as a result, the system
needs more innovative solutions. Part III of this paper first exam-
ines several proposed solutions to the crisis, then advocates a
solution: a blend of legislation'to mandate coverage for employees
of large employers, tax credits to unemployed individuals or indi-
viduals employed by small- and mid-sized businesses, and
purchasing pools to mimic the market benefits that employer
groups achieve.
A. Modest Proposals
Commentators have suggested several solutions, including creat-
ing voluntary purchasing pools by which uninsured persons can
108. All Things Considered Profile, supra note 85.
109. Id. The California Chamber of Commerce considers the California bill to be a
threat to midsize business and plans to challenge the law. Id.
110. Peter Cappelli, What Will the Future of Employment Policy Look Like?, 55 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REv. 724, 726 (2002).
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replicate the risk-spreading benefits of an employment group, in-
stituting a single-payor government sponsored system, and
providing refundable tax credits to put money directly into the
hands of the uninsured. All of these proposals are plagued by fun-
damental flaws such that if implemented as a stand-alone solution,
they would fail even more people than the current system does.
1. Purchasing Pools-Many advocates of reform point to private
insurance purchasing associations as the solution. In such associa-
tions, individuals are grouped together and acquire health
insurance coverage much the same way that employers do now. In
theory, these associations negotiate lower rates and achieve
economies of scale through inter-association competition.
Although several states have implemented forms of purchasing
pools in which small businesses join together make health insur-
ance affordable,"' voluntary individual purchasing pools would be
much less effective. If voluntary pools are protected from regula-
tion, as large employers are now, and are allowed to set rates
according to the pool's claims experience, which provides an in-
centive to lower costs and to bargain for better rates, the system
could have a detrimental effect on other markets for insurance."
2
Pools with better claims experiences will likely "draw off the better
risks from the individual and small group markets, causing them to
collapse into high-risk pools."'1 3 Setting rates according to the
claims experience could also result in a shop-around effect: when
different associations offer similar coverage based on the risk pro-
file of people belonging to the pool, it creates a "turbulent market
dynamic" in which people continually shop for pools with healthier
members.14 Finally, purchasing pools would not actually improve
economies of scale because transaction costs remain high: each
insured would require individual service instead of a single pur-
chaser (such as an employer) acting for an entire group. 15
In summary, the benefits of voluntary purchasing pools are
limited: they are a. poor imitation of the efficiencies that
employment-based insurance pools create, and lack the cohesion,
risk-spreading, and economies of scale that inhere in employment-
based pools."
6
111. Weisul, supra note 61, at 1.
112. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 21, at 37.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 37-38.
116. Id. at 38.
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2. Single-Payor Systems-Reformers repeatedly tout single-payor
systems, especially government-implemented and administered
plans, as constituting the best fix for the health-insurance crisis,
and have pointed to other industrialized countries as examples of
successfully implemented programs. 1 7 Single-payor systems do
solve some of the problems of other proposed systems, in particu-
lar, the risk-adjustment problem that arises when insurance
purchase is not mandated. In such a situation, healthy people will
drop their coverage, while subsidies are required for people who
are unable to afford coverage." 8 To prevent insurer "red-lining" of
subscribers who become expensive (meaning that their health
costs exceed the premium) the subsidies must be risk-adjusted, and
risk adjustment is imperfect at best."9 Single-payor systems also
solve the "adverse selection" phenomenon. Both the risk-
adjustment and the adverse selection problems are eliminated
simply because all people are covered, regardless of their particular
risk.
However, single-payor systems do have drawbacks. Perhaps the
largest hurdle to implementing a single-payor system is supplanting
current private expenditures with public tax dollars. When imple-
menting a single-payor system, the government would have to
increase tax receipts to fully replace the entire amount of private
health care payments, which outrages employers and insurers, not
to mention employees. 2' Single-payor systems are uniquely suscep-
tible to problems such as budgetary pressures, since available
health care funding amounts "are determined every year based on
117. The country most often used as an example of a successful single-payor system is
Canada, which has a publicly financed, privately delivered health care system, known to
Canadians as "Medicare." The system has evolved over fifty years to its present form in which
each province or territory is responsible for managing and delivering health services in
adherence to national principles, and provides public access to medically necessary hospital,
inpatient, and outpatient health services. Canada finances the system through taxation,
primarily in the form of provincial and federal personal and corporate income taxes, as well
as through some provincial sales taxes, payroll levies, and lottery proceeds. See generally
HEALTH CANADA, CARE NETWORK website, available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hppb/
healthcare; Roche, supra note 13 (surveying various countries' universal health care systems,
including Germany, Japan, Canada, and the Netherlands).
118. Hyman & Hall, supra note 21, at 38.
119. Id.
120. See supra Part II.B.1.
121. In 1999, private health spending was estimated at $654 billion. To raise this
amount to replace all private spending would require an 89% rise in federal income tax
receipts, or a 39% rise in all federal revenues, including not only personal and corporate
taxes, but also Social Security, Medicare, and inheritance. ALAN SAGER & DEBORAH SOCOLAR,
RAISING THE MONEY FOR HEALTH CARE FOR ALL: TRADITIONAL SINGLE PAYOR FINANCING VER-
SUS POOLED FINANCING, available at http://dcc2.bumc.bu.edu/hs/UploadO6lOO2/Raising%
20the%20money%20for%20HEALTH%2OCARE%20FOR%20ALL.pdf (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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how effectively health care can compete with other budgetary pri-
orities.' 2 In single-payor government-run systems, the government
must also "navigate the complexities of setting prices, picking
qualified providers, and making long-term capital investment deci-
sions." Each of these efforts increases the amount of bureaucracy
required to perform these tasks, creating coordination problems
which have the potential to increase cost, diminish options for ac-
cess and compromise quality of care.
12 3
Opponents vociferously denounce such complex single-payor
systems as requiring too much oversight, and claim that the "so-
cialization" of medicine would result in decreased quality of
services. 124 When the government begins allocating health care
benefits and services, critics argue, it eliminates individual freedom
to contract for medical services. 12 5 Americans tend to view bureauc-
racy and government programs that limit market choices with
suspicion, further clouding the outlook for single-payor systems.
126
3. Tax Credits-Recently, legislators announced several propos-
als for health insurance tax credits. 27 Many, if not most, of the
plans have the advantage of bipartisan support, but still fail to
solve, and often exacerbate, many of the adverse selection and risk
spreading problems endemic in the market. The main feature of
most plans is a refundable tax credit: an individual or family can
benefit from the credit even if they pay no income taxes. The plans
differ chiefly in the proposals for implementation and delivery of
the tax credits, with most of the debate centering on whether the
tax credit should be given to employers or directly to individuals. 2
122. Hyman & Hall, supra note 21, at 38.
123. Id. Canada is in the process of reforming its health care system to address some of
these same criticisms. See generally Allan S. Detsky & C. David Naylor, Canada's Health Care
System-Reform Delayed, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 804 (Aug. 21, 2003).
124. See Litman, supra note 55, at 876.
125. Id.
126. A mere "two out of every ten citizens believe that the government 'will do the right
thing most of the time.'" Litman, supra note 55, at 876 (citation omitted).
127. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 3529, which provided health insurance
tax credits as part of the economic stimulus bill, on December 20, 2001. LYNN ETHEREDGE,
THE HERITAGE FOUND., How To ADMINISTER HEALTH INSURANCE; BACKGROUNDER #1516
(Jan. 31, 2002), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Healthcare/BG1516.cfm
(on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
128. There is, of course, extensive debate over the amount of the proposed tax credits.
Proposals vary widely; most establish flat-dollar credits for individuals and families, some
index the credits to the Consumer Price Index, while one provides a credit equal to 30% of
the cost of health insurance premiums. IRIS J. LAV &JOEL FRIEDMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET AND
POLICY PRIORITIES, TAX CREDITS FOR INDIVIDUALS TO Buy HEALTH INSURANCE WON'T HELP
MANY UNINSURED FAMILIES 17 (Feb. 15, 2001), available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-15-
Oltax2.pdf (on file with the University of Michiganjournal of Law Reform).
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Many commentators denounce the trend toward implementing
social policy through tax credits. Although tax credits often receive
bipartisan support,2 9 in actuality many tax credits never reach the
low-income families who are the intended recipients. Tax credits
only reach those who file income taxes; the tax system exempts
those with low- or no-income from filing tax returns, precluding
receipt of tax credits. The ostensible solution is a refundable tax
credit, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which allows
the government to write a check.1 3 However, the refundable tax
credit has several downsides. To work with the current system, re-
fundable tax credits are limited to those with positive earnings
necessitating tax return filing.13 ' Further, refundable tax credits are
typically paid in a lump sum at the end of the year, requiring re-
cipients to wait until then to receive money to pay expenses.131
Many proposals calling for health care tax credits would exacerbate
this effect by requiring recipients to pay for their health insurance
throughout the year without receiving any immediate credit to off-
set expenditures.
A system that gives tax credits directly to small- and mid-sized
businesses that currently do not provide health insurance would
eliminate neither the difficulties employers face when attempting
to choose a plan that fits the needs of all employees, nor the high
costs that small business owners incur because of their inability to
form large risk-spreading pools. In addition, if the government
provides tax credits only to small businesses, "it ends up subsidizing
the insurance of highly paid workers such as doctors, lawyers and
computer engineers who work for small firms," undermining the
purpose of the tax credit, which is to assist people who are unable
129. Republicans like credits because they look like tax cuts, while Democrats like them
because they achieve social policy goals without officially raising spending. William G. Gale,
Editorial, Tax Credits: Social Policy in Bad Disguise, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE -MONITOR, Feb. 16,
1999, at 11.
130. FRANK SAMMARTINO & ERIC TODER, URBAN INST., SOCIAL -POLICY AND THE
TAX SYSTEM 5 (Jan. 1, 2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310418_
TaxSystem.pdf (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
131. Id. The EITC is less cumbersome than many other social programs, such as the
Food Stamp program, which requires personal trips to government offices and completion
of applications and documentation. Id. at 13. In contrast, the EITC only requires filing an
additional schedule with a recipient's tax return. Id. at 13-14. However, many recipients find
income tax forms.complex and pay a professional tax preparer to complete their return,
further depleting the amount received from the credit. Id. at 14.
132. SAMMARTINO & TODER, supra note 130, at 14. To get their returns faster, many
EITC recipients pay fees to arrange refund anticipation loans. Id. If annualized, the average
interest rate for a refund anticipation loan is 222.5%. Press Release, Consumers Union,
Consumers Union Advises Taxpayers to Avoid Refund Loans (Feb. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/RAL-03.htm (on file with the University of
Michigan lournal of Law Reform).
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to afford insurance. 3 3 Income restrictions on the credit could raise
well-founded privacy concerns: employers would have to obtain
income information on employees and others in their house-
holds.134 Finally, tax credits to small businesses would fail to cover
groups of uninsured people who either not working or are working
for large companies but cannot afford their share of the premi-
ums.
Instead of paying credits to employers, tax credits could be paid
directly to employees. However, aside from the practical cash-flow
effects that delayed receipt of tax credits has on low-income recipi-
ents, there are more general class and market effects to a system
that delivers tax credits directly to employees instead of providing
the credits to employers. If employees have to go it alone in the
insurance market, it will be difficult for older people and less-
healthy people to obtain insurance at reasonable costs.' 35 Employer-
based health plans might fall by the wayside as employers elect not
to provide coverage because employees would be able to secure an
individual tax credit. Although tax credit advocates claim that the
credit will help create a market for cheap health insurance plans,1
36
others disagree. Proposals that allow individuals to choose to use
their credit either for employer-based coverage or for privately
purchased insurance would exacerbate the adverse selection phe-
nomenon; younger and healthier employees would look for lower-
cost coverage outside of employer plans, resulting in increased
premiums in employer-based plans for the older or less-healthy
employees who remain in those plans.37
Regardless of which method of delivery is selected or whether
the credit is refundable, tax credits complicate the tax code. Each
additional credit makes tax policy more complex and makes it less
likely that broad tax reforms will succeed m However, the practice
133. Press Release, The Heritage Found., Give Health Insurance Tax Credits Directly to
Employees, Study Says (Mar. 19, 2001), available at http://www.heritage.org/Press/
NewsReleases/NR031901.cfm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
134. Id.
135. LAy & FRIEDMAN, supra note 128, at 2.
136. SAMMARTINO & TODER, supra note 130, at 18.
137. Instead of decreasing the number of uninsured, adverse selection in this scenario
could actually increase that number. Because of adverse selection, some employers would
drop coverage for their employees, preferring that employees use the tax credit instead of
providing benefits, creating 4.1 million newly uninsured employees that would be forced to
buy insurance outside the marketplace. LAV & FRIEDMAN, supra note 128, at 8.
138. In recent years, many reformers have called for extensive reforms of the existing
progressive tax structure. Proposals include supplanting the income tax for the first
$100,000 in income, instituting a flat tax, and eliminating income tax entirely in favor of the
value-added tax. SeeJulie Roin, The Consequences of Undoing the Federal Income Tax, 70 U. CHI.
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of implementing social policy via the tax code is not likely to
change anytime soon. The tax system provides a structure through
which social reforms can be accomplished more efficiently and
with less bureaucratic expansion than would result from the crea-
tion of an entirely new government program. Put simply, we have
gotten used to using the tax system to implement social policies
ranging from the EITC to credits for college education. Even if
some tax credits are bad policy, the tax system achieves other so-
cially useful policies more efficiently than other approaches
would.
139
B. Putting it All Together-Crafting the Best Solution
Even the most frequendy advocated solutions discussed in the
previous section have significant shortcomings. While one proposal
may remedy a particular aspect, the basic problem is so complex
and of such magnitude that no single proposal will be able to solve
one issue without simultaneously creating or exacerbating another.
With that in mind, using government mandates to retain the cur-
rent employment-based system, but supplementing the system by
adding advance, refundable tax credits and creating purchasing
pools will provide the most comprehensive and workable answer to
the health care crisis. Although "tweaking" the employment-based
system is a much less sweeping solution than many reformers
would advocate, it may be the most politically viable, practically
workable, and socially acceptable way in which to proceed.
140
The employment-based system should be maintained as it is and
should be free from government mandates that disproportionately
affect small- and mid-sized business growth. Although a significant
portion of the population is uninsured,' 4' employer-based plans
insure a considerable majority of Americans. 42 Mandates that affect
L. REv. 319 (2003); Michael J. Graetz, Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before the American College of
Tax Counsel: Erwin Griswold's Tax Law-And Ours, 56 TAX LAW. 173 (2002).
139. See SAMMARTINO & TODER, supra note 130, at 7.
140. According to Professors Hyman and Hall, the repeated failure of attempts to cre-
ate a national health care system testify to the difficulties that confront aspiring reformers.
In health care, there are too many competing vested interests, and too few people who are
fundamentally dissatisfied with their coverage, for comprehensive reform to be politically
viable under ordinary circumstances. We believe that incremental reforms are all that is
likely to emerge from the political process during the foreseeable future. Hyman & Hall,
supranote 21, at 39.
141. 15.2% of the population is uninsured. Richwine, supra note 5.
142. 64.1% of Americans are covered by health insurance plans related to employment.
ROBERT J. MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS-HEALTH INSUR-
[VOL. 37:3
Liberty, Justice, and InsuranceforAll
only large employers, most of which already offer health insurance
benefits, reinforce the status quo while avoiding the effects on
business growth that result from broader mandates. Large em-
ployer mandates do not disrupt the competitive job market:
mandated coverage would act as a floor, allowing large employers
to continue to use health benefits above that floor to compete for
employees. In addition, large employer mandates reduce the risk
that employers will drop coverage when the credit is implemented,
choosing to let their employees take the credit and fend for them-
selves.
With coverage by large employers mandated, the holes in the
employment-based system-the dearth of coverage for part-time
employees, for employees of small- and mid-sized businesses, and
for the unemployed and other displaced workers-could be
patched by introducing tax credits given directly to employees. Use
of the tax credit could be limited to those persons who pre-qualify
by electing to purchase insurance through a large purchasing pool,
perhaps through a state coalition, 4 which would help spread risk
among large groups and keep insurance costs down.
Potential recipients would apply for the tax credit during an en-
rollment period.1 44 The credit would only be available to those who
are not insured by their employer because their employer does not
offer insurance, because the person is unemployed and not cov-
ered by a family member, or because the premiums exceed a
certain percentage of household income. Those eligible for the tax
credit would choose a purchasing pool with which to be affiliated,
select a qualified plan, and determine a desired amount of payroll
deductions (if any premium cost remains after deducting the tax
credit) to be withheld from paychecks by employers or from un-
employment compensation. 45 Persons who prefer to sign up for,
or continue receiving, coverage with public programs such as
ANCE COVERAGE: 2000 2 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/
p60-215.pdf (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
143. This is a watered down version of Representative Pete Stark's proposal, which
would allow tax credits to be claimed only for the purchase of qualified plans sold through a
new federal Office of Health Insurance. LAV & FRIEDMAN, supra note 128, at 17. However,
many supporters of tax credits strongly oppose such regulation and it is highly unlikely that
Congress would pass a tax credit with that type of federal regulation. Id. State purchasing
pools may be more palatable to legislators.
144. Modeled after annual open enrollment periods currently employed by public and
private entities. Most open enrollment periods designate a specific window of time in which
employees can change their benefit coverage; elections are in effect until the next annual
enrollment period, unless the employee experiences a qualifying change in family or em-
ployment status (e.g. birth of a child, marriage, or a spouse/partner secures employment).
145. Those without surplus income, for example, students, should choose a default
"zero premium" plan. Etheredge, supra note 127, at n.10.
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Medicare or SCHIP could also choose to do so during the enroll-
ment period. Once employers withhold premiums, they would
send them to a central clearinghouse for remittance to insurers.
Existing payroll systems and unemployment processing systems
could process the credits and premiums. The IRS acts as a financial
intermediary for achieving many policy goals. 46 The existing infra-
structure-Social Security numbers, wage and payroll tax
withholding, and information reporting-can all be utilized to is-
sue tax credits. 147 By using the IRS and existing systems, the reform
would avoid expanding the income tax filing system or creating a
"lag time" while individuals wait for vouchers and mail them to in-
surance companies. The insurers would notify the Treasury
Department of their selection by an employee; the Treasury De-
partment would then pay insurers the portion of the tax credit due
for the payroll period.
48
This solution has numerous advantages. The eligibility require-
ments ensure that tax credits do not go to persons covered
through an employment-based system, avoiding the spiral of ad-
verse selection that would occur if healthy employees chose to take
the tax credit and opt out of, their employer-provided coverage.149
Requiring affiliation with a heterogeneous purchasing pool before
receiving the tax credit spreads the insurer's risk throughout the
pool, improving economies of scale and making it possible for
older people and people with health problems to obtain insurance.
Deducting premiums above the credit amount from payroll checks
and unemployment compensation does. not create an administra-
tive morass: payroll and unemployment compensation systems
already process a minimum of eight standard deductions from
checks. 5° Set enrollment periods provide a level of certainty for
insurers' risk calculations. Finally, with the advent of widespread
electronic banking, remittance of premiums and tax credits to in-
surers could be paperless and would only marginally increase
administrative responsibilities.
146. For example, the IRS administers the Earned Income Tax Credit, a progressive, re-
fundable tax credit. Fred T Goldberg,Jr., From FDR to W The IRS as Financial Intermediary, 29
OHIo N.U. L. Rav. 1, 11 (2001).
147. Id. at 12.
148. Etheredge, supra note 127, at 3.
149. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 21, at 40 ("[T]he more extensive the tax credits, the
greater the potential for adverse selection, as younger and healthier employees can suddenly
exit existing pools ... we suggest that tax credit proposals should initially focus on those
who do not currently have access to employment-based coverage.").
150. Employer payroll processes handle deductions and reports, including Social Secu-
rity payments, Medicare and income tax payments, and unemployment and disability
insurance. Etheredge, supra note 127, at 3.
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However, this proposal is not perfect. Although tax credits paid
through the existing payroll, unemployment, and Social Security
disbursement systems will make the tax credits available to all
persons that receive such income, those who do not work or
receive any government assistance will fall through the cracks.
These people will continue to rely on direct spending programs for
health coverage.15 Risk spreading by forming state purchasing
pools may be considerably more difficult than many proponents
suggest."'
The biggest obstacle to implementing a refundable tax credit
through advance disbursements is the possibility that a tax credit
recipient might owe the government money at the end of the year.
Advance credits are based upon predictions of a recipient's yearly
income.15 3 Because individual and family incomes can fluctuate
throughout the year, a taxpayer could receive an advance tax
credit, but during reconciliation at tax time, could find out that
such fluctuation precludes eligibility.54 The IRS could be responsi-
ble for determining eligibility, but such responsibility would add
another level of bureaucracy to the process and, for many Ameri-
cans, would evoke the specter of increased government intrusion
into everyday life. Further, the IRS has a discouraging record for
correctly determining eligibility: a recent IRS study discovered that
25.6% of EITC claims were erroneous. 155 Currently, the IRS does
not collect information on health coverage. 56 Perhaps employers
could bear some of the burden in assisting with eligibility determi-
nations, but that would not necessarily eliminate the possibility of
error and abuse.
CONCLUSION
The number of uninsured Americans has reached crisis propor-
tions. This crisis has alarming life-and-death effects on real people
and families. Although the American health insurance system is
largely employer-based and has been since World War II, it still fails
to insure a significant number of people. Legislative solutions and
151. SAMMARTINO & TODER, supra note 130, at 5.
152. LAv & FRIEDMAN, supra note 128, at 7.
153. SAMMARTINO & TODER, supra note 130, at 15.
154. Experiences with the EITC, another advance, refundable tax credit, have shown
that families are deterred from using this option for fear of owing money to the IRS at tax
time. LAv & FRIEDMAN, supra note 128, at 11.
155. SAMMARTINO & TODER, supra note 130, at 14.
156. LAV & FRIEDMAN, supra note 128, at 12.
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programs such as ERISA, SCHIP, and Medicare and Medicaid have
neglected to remedy the predicament in which many people find
themselves. State reform efforts have had moderate success in cre-
ating alternative programs, with California's employer-mandated
coverage being the most recent attempt.
Employer mandates may seem to benefit employees and make a
dent in the number of uninsured, but if they are too far reaching,
they ultimately impair the ability of small- and medium-sized busi-
ness to function, much less grow. Employer mandates may be
necessary to maintain the current level of employer-based cover-
age, but effective solutions need to combine mandates with other
programs to mitigate their detrimental effects.
Reform advocates variously tout single-payor systems, private
purchasing pools, and tax credits as solutions that will miraculously
overhaul our employer-based system and solve our health insur-
ance crisis. However, the employer-based system is largely effective
at insuring our population and is so fundamental to Americans'
perception and valuation of employment that it would be virtually
impossible to abandon wholesale. This Note advocates a combina-
tion of large-employer mandates to maintain the current employer
based system, refundable tax credits to help employees of small-
and medium-size business, low-income workers and unemployed
persons to afford coverage, and purchasing pools to reduce the
effect of adverse selection and maximize risk-spreading.
Although this combination falls short of perfection, perfection is
not the goal. Valid reform ideas should act in accordance with
ethical and societal norms and should be politically achievable and
legally workable. With these standards in mind, the proposed re-
form is valid: it would effectively reduce the number of uninsured
Americans while placing virtually no burdens on the insurance and
labor markets, employers, or existing administrative systems and it
is politically and legally achievable, especially in light of the exten-
sive bipartisan support for reforms incorporating tax credits. On
balance, the benefits of this reform should outweigh the costs. It is
time America prioritized health insurance for all.
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